Access to Information as a Human Right by Mathiesen, Kay
Access to Information as a Human Right
Kay Mathiesen





Using  the  methods  of  philosophical  analysis  and 
argumentation,  this  paper  delineates  and  defends  the  claim 
that access to information is a fundamental  human right. A 
number  of  key distinctions  and concepts are  explained  and 
clarified. The classic Hohfeldian (1919) analysis of rights is 
presented,  making  clear  the  important  distinctions  between 
privilege, liberty, and welfare rights. Human rights are placed 
within  this  framework  and  their  moral  foundation  is 
articulated. The fundamental value of access to information is 
explained and defended. It is argued that public libraries play 
an important role in satisfying the human right to access.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Human rights have been characterized as rights to those
resources and circumstances necessary for living a minimally 
good life [1].  Information rights include rights to create and 
communicate  information  (e.g.,  freedom  of  expression, 
freedom  of  association),  to  control  others’  access  to 
information (e.g., privacy and intellectual property), and rights 
to access information (e.g., freedom of thought, the right to 
read).   Some  information  rights  have  been  recognized  as 
human  rights  in  international  instruments  (e.g.,  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, Declaration on the Rights of the 
Child, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People).  The 
Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights  lists  a  number  of 
rights  related  to  information  access  and  control  (see  [2] 
Articles  18,  19,  25,  and  26).  Philosophers  and  educational 
theorists have argued that persons have some rights related to 
information access, e.g., the right of freedom of thought and 
expression (e.g.,  [3], [4], [5]) and the right to an education 
(e.g., [6], [7], [8], [9]). However, such rights have not been 
conceptualized  as  founded  in  a  more  basic  human right  to 
information.  This paper focuses on those rights related to 
free  access  to  information  and  argues  that  access  to 
information is indeed a fundamental human right.  It is further 
argued that the right to access is not merely a liberty right, but 
also a welfare right. That is,  individuals’  information rights 
place duties on governments to provide access to information. 
The  main  line  of  argument  presented  in  this  paper  is  as 
follows. I argue that access to information is indeed 
necessary in order to live a “minimally good life” in at least 
three ways.  First, human beings are creatures with a capacity 
and  a  desire  for  knowledge.   As  Aristotle  wrote  in  the 
Metaphysics, “All human beings by nature desire to know.”  A 
life deprived of adequate access to information and knowledge 
is a seriously impoverished life.   Second,  knowledge is not 
only good in itself; it is pragmatically essential that persons 
have access to information if they are to have the capacity to 
exercise their other rights. In this sense, knowledge is what J. 
Rawls [10] called a “primary good,” that is, it is a good that is 
useful to anyone, whatever his or her plan of life or conception 
of the good.  Third, in order for persons to effectively exercise 
and protect their other rights, they need access to information. 
I conclude the paper by arguing that free public libraries are 
an  essential  public  institution  necessary  for  ensuring  that 
citizens have adequate access to information. 
While  I  will  appeal  to  those  rights  listed  in  the  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other United Nations and 
International rights documents, this is a work in moral theory. 
It is not an exercise in explicating what follows from the U.N. 
declarations or international law.  I am arguing for a particular 
understanding  of  the  underpinning  values  promoted  by  the 
rights listed in these documents.  In so doing, I may argue that 
our  human  rights  extend  beyond  what  has  been  explicitly 
encoded in human rights documents.  
2. LIMITS OF THE “INTELLECTUAL 
FREEDOM” MODEL
The  discussion  of  access  to  information  within  both  the 
philosophical  and  LIS literature  has  focused on intellectual 
freedom, e.g., rights to free speech and to a free press.  While 
intellectual freedom is crucial,  it  is  at  best  only half  of the 
answer to people’s crucial information needs.  Free speech and 
freedom  of  the  press  gain  their  primary  value  from  their 
capacity to provide people with information and knowledge. 
Indeed, in his seminal defense of freedom of expression, “On 
Freedom of  Thought  and Discussion”  [3],  John Stuart  Mill 
hinges his  defense  of free  expression  on the importance of 
people being able to weigh all sides of an issue.  According to 
his argument, free speech is to be defended on the grounds 
that persons ought to be able to access information.  However, 
in much everyday talk on “freedom of speech” the worry is 
whether  someone  is  free  to  “speak  her  mind,”  rather  than 
whether others have a right to listen to what she has to say. 
In  the  United  States,  for  instance,  much  more  discussion 
focuses on the problem of censorship, than on the problem of 
access.   The  American  Library  Association,  for  example, 
celebrates “Banned Books Week” to point out the dangers of 
censorship,  but  has  no  such week  set  aside  for  noting  the 
dangers of suppressed information or the problem of limited 
access to information by the poor and disenfranchised.  While 
there are multiple statements and articles on censorship, there 
is very little discussion, for example, about the role that library 
fines might have in discouraging poor people from using the 
library. 
To the extent that access to information has been considered a 
right of the receiver, the literature has mostly centered on the 
right  to  education.   The  right  to  education  is  reasonably 
focused  on  the  education  of  children.   But,  the  need  for 
accurate, objective, timely information is life-long.  Much of 
the point of an education is to equip people to be “life-long” 
learners, by giving them the basic skills to be able to process 
written and numeric information.  These are skills that need to 
be  practiced  into  adulthood  to  be  retained  and  be  useful. 
Without access to information these skills lie fallow.  
3. TYPES OF RIGHTS
We use the language of “rights” easily and frequently, but this 
use is often quite equivocal and covers a number of important 
distinctions that we will want to keep clear in the following 
discussion.  
3.1 Hohfeldian Rights
Famously, W. Hohfeld  [11] distinguished a whole range of 
types  of  rights.  Here  I  do  not  give  the  entire  Hohfeldian 
schema,  but  note  an  important  distinction  between  two 
Hofeldian  rights—privilege  rights  and  claim  rights.   These 
two  types  of  rights  are  what  H.L.A.  Hart  called  "primary 
rights" [12] to highlight the fact that many other rights derive 
from them.     
If I have a “privilege right” to do something, that means that I 
am not obliged to refrain from doing it—in other words, I am 
allowed, permitted, or free to do it. So, for example, if I have 
the privilege right to read a particular book, that means that I 
don’t have any duties to not read or to refrain from reading.  I 
am free to read the book (or not).  Hohfeld would be quick to 
point out that a mere “privilege right” provides me with no 
guarantee that I will actually be in a position to read the book. 
To say that I have a right to read in this sense doesn’t mean 
that anyone else is obliged to let me read. So, for example, if I 
merely have a “privilege right” to read, you are free to destroy 
any copies of the book you get your hands on, to criticize me 
publicly  for  reading  the  book,  to  refuse  to  support  public 
institutions  that  might  teach  me  to  read,  or  to  refuse  to 
distribute the book via the library or bookstores.  This sort of 
right puts no obligations on others to act  or not act  in any 
particular way.
Hohfeld thought that such privileges were not properly called 
“rights,” since genuine rights of one person always put a duty 
on others to respect the right.  He calls rights, which impose 
such duties on others “claim rights.”  Typically when someone 
says that  they have a right  to  x,  they are  referring to such 
“claim rights.”  So, for example, if I have a claim right to read, 
that means that others have correlative duties that they ought 
to fulfill. If I have a claim right to read a book, others have 
some sort of duty to make the world such that I actually can 
effectively read.  If you fail to do your duty in this regard, then 
you are “violating” my right.  
3.2 Liberty and Welfare Rights
If  I  have a  claim right,  others’  correlative  duties  might  be 
either “negative” (requiring others to refrain from interfering 
with my actions) or “positive” (requiring others to act so as to 
assist me).  A right which imposes merely negative duties on 
others  is  called  a  “liberty”  right.   A  right  which  imposes 
positive duties on others is called a “welfare” right.  If I have a 
liberty right to read, then others are obligated to refrain from 
interfering with my reading. If I have a welfare right to read, 
others  are  obligated  to  provide  me  with  the  conditions 
necessary for reading.   So, for example,  if  I  have a liberty 
right to read, that may place a duty on others to refrain from 
criticizing me publicly for reading the book, from turning off 
the lights so I can’t read the book, or from removing the book 
from the public library. If I have a welfare right to read, for 
example,  others  may  be  obligated  to  fund  public  schools 
where  I  would  be  taught  to  read,  to  make  information 
available in my language, or to support public libraries. 
4. HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights have been defined as the rights that protect our 
interests  in  having  “those  resources  and  circumstances 
necessary for living a minimally good life” [1].  These rights 
are those we have simply in virtue of being human, and are 
not tied to membership in any particular political society or 
state.   Such  rights  may  be  liberty  rights—what  are  often 
termed in the international law literature “political rights”—or 
welfare rights—what are often labeled in the international law 
literature “socio-economic rights.”  In what follows, I will rely 
on this basic definition of a human right.  There are a number 
of different accounts of the moral basis of these rights, but we 
need not enter into those debates here.  I will,  however, be 
taking  the  view  according  to  which  rights  are  seen  as 
protecting our “interests.” By interests I do not merely mean 
something we find “interesting,” but our fundamental  needs 
and goals as human beings [13].  On this view a “minimally 
good life” is one wherein we have a meaningful capacity to 
satisfy (or have satisfied) our fundamental interests as human 
beings. 
There  are  some  further  points  worth  making  about  the 
obligations that human rights impose on others.  Human rights 
are  typically  understood  as  those  rights  that  states  must 
respect.  Typically, whether an action violates a human right 
depends on whether there was a state actor involved.  A state 
may infringe a human right either by directly doing something 
that  violates  a  right—e.g.,  by  failing  to  provide  basic 
education for children or by suppressing unpopular speech—
or  it  may  do  so  by  failing  to  provide  a  legal  structure 
necessary to prevent systematic abuses.  So, for example, if a 
state fails to have any laws forbidding child labor, then it is 
guilty of a human rights violation. 
While  many theories claim that  the obligations required by 
respecting human rights only apply to governments, it seems 
perfectly natural to say that individual persons can also engage 
in human rights violations.  It would be odd to say that a state 
is violating human rights by allowing a corporation to employ 
child  labor,  but that  the corporation is not violating human 
rights  when  it  (legally)  employs  children.   On  my  view, 
individuals  or  non-government  groups  may  violate  human 
rights as well as governments.  However, when persons have 
welfare rights these primarily place obligations on society as a 
whole,  and thus on  the entities  which  regulate  society  and 
have the power to distribute and redistribute income and other 
goods—e.g., governments. 
5. ACCESS TO INFORMATION AS A 
HUMAN RIGHT
In this section, I argue that access to information is indeed a 
resource necessary for living a minimally good life.  It should 
be noted, that, while I do not discuss the issue of information 
quality here, it is clear that in arguing that people have a right 
to access information, I mean that they have a right to access 
quality information (just as a right to food implies a right to 
sufficiently nutritious food).  There are several dimensions of 
information  quality,  including  accuracy,  completeness, 
currency,  and  comprehensibility  [14].  The  inclusion  of 
comprehensibility points to a further feature of information. 
Some  document  or  other  communicative  format  is 
“informative” to a person only to the extent that she is able to 
comprehend  the  information  contained  in  the  document. 
Thus,  fulfilling  the  right  to  access  information  will  often 
require that we consider in what format the information will 
be  most  comprehensible  to  the  people  who  need  it.   In 
addition,  the  right  to  information  will  often  require  that 
resources  be  devoted  to  giving  people  the  needed skills  to 
comprehend  information,  e.g.,  through  efforts  to  increase 
literacy.
5.1 Fundamental Interests in Information
In  his  work  on the right  to  freedom of  expression,  Gerald 
Cohen has admirably  summed up the fundamental  interests 
that are protected by a right to information.  J. Cohen specified 
three fundamental interests ([5], 223-230), which I discuss in 
detail below: (1) the interest in expression,  (2) the interest in 
deliberation, and (3) the interest in knowledge.
5.1.1 The Expressive Interest
Cohen  [5]  defines  the  interest  in  expression  as,  “a  direct 
interest  in  articulating  thoughts,  attitudes,  and  feelings  on 
matters of  personal  or  broader  human concern and perhaps 
through that articulation influencing the thought and conduct 
of others.” Note that, while Cohen’s emphasis is on acts of 
expression  directed  to  others  with  the  goal  of  “influencing 
thought and conduct,” this should not be understood as limited 
to  those  works  that  are  clearly  propositional  in  character. 
Works  of  art,  such  as  novels,  music,  photographs,  and 
paintings also “articulate” “thoughts, attitudes, and feelings.” 
There are a number of ways in which  access to expression 
supports this  interest  in  expressing.   First,  as  Cohen notes, 
most acts of expression are acts of communication to others. 
By  promoting  access  to  information,  we  are  enabling  the 
success of such expressive acts by connecting, for instance, 
the writer with the reader.  Second, in order to engage in acts 
of expression people need a rich information culture that will 
allow  them  to  develop  their  ideas  and  learn  how  to 
communicate them effectively. 
There  is,  however,  more  to  the  interest  in  expression  than 
Cohen’s account covers.  Cohen does point out how access to 
expression  satisfies  the  receiver’s  deliberative  and 
informational  interests,  but  he  does  not  recognize  an 
independent interest in accessing expression.  It would be a 
mistake,  however,  to  think  that  the  interest  in  accessing 
other’s  expressive  acts  is  merely  derived  from  the  more 
fundamental interest that others have in expressing themselves 
to  us.   Human  beings  have  an  independent  interest  in 
accessing the expressions of others.  Just as we have a need to 
express ourselves, we have a need to hear others expressions. 
We have, in other words, “a direct interest in accessing the 
thoughts,  attitudes,  and  feelings  of  others  on  matters  of 
personal  or  broader  human  concern.”   A  person  without 
opportunities to receive the expressions of others, would be 
denied  experiencing  a  fundamental  aspect  of  human  life. 
Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes 
this need in Article 27, where it states that, “Everyone has the 
right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community 
[and] to enjoy the arts…”[2]. 
5.1.2 The Deliberative Interest
In addition to our direct interest in expressing ourselves and 
hearing  what  others  have to  say,  access  to  expressions  are 
necessary  to  satisfy  what  Cohen  calls  our  “deliberative 
interests.”   The deliberative interest  concerns our  ability  to 
revise and gain a deeper understanding of our individual and 
collectively  held  beliefs  and  commitments.   This  requires 
access to expressions of others, due to “the familiar fact that 
reflection on matters of human concern cannot be pursued in 
isolation.   As  John  Stuart  Mill  emphasized,  reflection 
characteristically  proceeds  against  the  background  of  an 
articulation of alternative views by other people” ([3], 229).  It 
is  only  in  the  context  of  free  access  to  the  full  range  of 
“alternative views,” according to Cohen, that we can engage 
in  deliberation  on  what  to  believe,  value,  and  do.  
5.1.3 The Knowledge Interest
Finally, access to others’ expressions allows us to leverage our 
collective epistemic  labor  and satisfy what  Cohen calls  our 
“informational  interests,”  what  I  call  here  our  “knowledge 
interests.”   The  “knowledge  interest”  is  the  “fundamental 
interest in securing reliable information about the conditions 
required for pursuing one’s aims and aspirations” ([5], 229). 
Without  access  to  such  knowledge,  individuals  and  groups 
will be unable to effectively carry out their aims.  In a free 
society, we assume that the individual and the collective good 
is  promoted by  persons having  the ability  to  determine  for 
themselves what they value and having the freedom to pursue 
those goals effectively (as long as they do not interfere with a 
similar  pursuit  by  others).   Access  to  the  information  and 
knowledge contained in the expressions of others allows us to 
do this.   Furthermore, the wellbeing of both individuals and 
groups  requires  that  we  base  our  actions  on  the  best 
knowledge available, knowledge we are unlikely to gain all on 
our own.
                             
However,  it  would  be  a  limited  understanding  of  human 
beings and human nature to think that knowledge only matters 
to us a means to some further end.  As Aristotle famously said 
in  the  Metaphysics,  “All  human beings by nature desire  to 
know.”  We find joy in knowledge and discovery—in just the 
mere state of knowing and having knowledge.  A life deprived 
of  such enjoyment  would be a  seriously impoverished life. 
Thus, we need to recognize that there is an intrinsic, as well as 
a  pragmatic  interest  in  knowledge.   
Given  the  importance  of  these  informational  interests  to 
human life both individually and collectively, we already have 
a strong argument that access to information is a human right. 
A minimally good human life is not possible without access to 
a rich array of expressions and to knowledge for both practical 
ends and intrinsic benefits to the human spirit.  Nevertheless, 
even if these interests were not sufficiently compelling, there 
would still be grounds for arguing that access to information is 
a  fundamental  human  right.   Access  to  information  is  a 
necessary  precondition  for  us  to  exercise  our  other  human 
rights. 
5.2 Access to Information as an Essential 
Instrumental Right
A moment’s reflection makes clear how useless many of our 
rights are if we are not given access to crucial information.  In 
an article entitled “The Right to Information as a Leverage 
Right,” S. Jagwanth ([14], 6) argues that, given that rights are 
interdependent, in order to be able to exercise our rights more 
generally, people must be given access to information.  Courts 
have  found,  for  example,  that  people  have  a  right  to 
information about environmental hazards and other potential 
threats to safety. It has been argued that rights to information 
extend  to  information  related  to  reproductive  health  and 
choice [15].  These are just a couple of examples of the types 
of information to which we may argue persons have a right to 
if  they  are  to  exercise  their  other  human rights.   Below I 
discuss some of the most crucial ways in which information 
provides the necessary precondition for our ability to exercise 
our other rights. 
First,  we need to be given access  to information  regarding 
what rights are. If we are not aware of what our rights are, or 
that we even have rights, then we cannot be our own or others’ 
advocates  in exercising  those rights.   For  instance,  any are 
familiar with the Miranda warning made famous by American 
cop shows.  This warning explicitly tells the suspect what his 
or her rights are.  The reasoning behind this warning is that, 
absent such information about their rights, a defendant cannot 
take an appropriate role in the exercise of those rights [16]. 
With regard to public information, it has been argued that that, 
“The right to access public information about one’s economic, 
social and cultural rights is not only related to these rights – it 
is  a  precondition  for  their  realization.  Without  information 
about the scope and content of their rights to health, housing 
or work, citizens are unable to determine whether their rights 
are  being  respected.  International  law  recognizes  this 
connection” ([17], 18). Indeed, recognizing the importance of 
this in the preamble to the UDHR, the UN declared, “That 
every  individual  and  every  organ  of  society,  keeping  this 
declaration constantly  in mind,  shall  strive by teaching and 
education to promote respect for these right and freedoms.”
Second,  once  we  know what  our  rights  are  we  may  need 
further information to know whether rights are being respected 
and how to press for their fulfillment.  In some cases, it may 
be obvious that the government is failing to respect my rights. 
In many other cases, however, it may not be as clear.  As the 
human rights organization Article 19 ([17], 20) points out, “to 
evaluate the extent to which the right to education is realized, 
it  is  necessary  to  have  access  to  literacy  rates,  enrollment 
rates, commuting times, dropout rates, and budgets, not only 
in  the  aggregate  but  disaggregated by  gender,  social  class, 
geographic centers (urban, rural), religion and ethnicity.”  It is 
particularly  important  in  this  context  that  governments  and 
others  who have crucial  information  with regard to actions 
that may violate rights have an obligation to provide citizens 
with this information.   Jagwanth ([14], 8) puts it succinctly 
when she notes that,   “[T]he right of access to information 
ensures  that  action  which  may  violate  one  or  other  of  the 
fundamental  rights  is  not  concealed  under  the  guise  of 
secrecy.”   
Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, we need access to 
information on a broad range of topics in order to have the 
capacity to exercise a plethora of our other human rights.  For 
example, if one is denied access to information about how to 
apply for jobs, for benefits, how to access and use health care, 
then,  for  all  intents  and purposes,  one  is  being  denied  the 
rights  to  such  things.   If  one  does  not  have at  least  basic 
information  about  who  is  running  in  an  election,  their 
positions,  their  past  experience  and actions,  then the rights 
listed in Article 21 of the UDHR [2], “Everyone has the right 
to  take  part  in  the  government  of  his  country,  directly  or 
through freely chosen representatives” are meaningless.  One 
cannot express one’s will in elections, if one does not have the 
information  necessary  to  make  one’s  choices  a  genuine 
expression of one’s values and preferences. 
5.3 Not Just a Liberty Right
As noted in  section  one,  the right  to  access  information  is 
typically understood and defended as a liberty right.  Indeed, 
Article  19 of  the UDHR, the key statement  of  the right  to 
information in the Declaration,  uses the language of liberty: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; 
this  right  includes  the  freedom  to  hold  opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and 
ideas  through  any  media  and  regardless  of  frontiers”  [2] 
[emphasis  added].  These liberty  rights must be respected if 
people’s fundamental interests in information and knowledge 
are  to  be protected.   Nevertheless,  mere freedom to access 
information  is  an  insufficient  protection  of  the  right  to 
information.  In this section, I argue that the only way that our 
fundamental  interests  to  access  to  information  can  be 
adequately  protected  is  if  they  are  understood  as 
encompassing  a  welfare  right  that  places  duties  on 
governments and others to supply people with the necessary 
information and knowledge. 
 
First, recognize that exercising the right to access information 
depends in most cases on the willingness of others to impart 
information and ideas.  As many philosophers have recently 
noted, most of our information and knowledge is received via 
“testimony”; that is, from the reports of others.  Typically in 
the discussion of intellectual freedom, we assume that others 
wish to communicate  with us—to tell  us  their  views,  their 
findings, etc.  Thus, the standard focus of concern is with the 
ability (or lack thereof) of persons to freely communicate with 
each other.  However, the interest that human beings have in 
accessing information cannot be met merely by ensuring that 
individuals are free to communicate with each other. 
Our interest in access to information and knowledge can only 
be fully protected by a welfare right that  obligates others to 
take  steps  that  will  enable  us  to  access  the  essential 
information that we need.  Consider, for example, the sorts of 
information  that  we  might  say  you  have  a  right  to.  E.g., 
“Information  on  matters  such  as  employment  schemes, 
obtaining certificates for various purposes, recommendations 
for  different  types  of  loans,  access  to  different  poverty 
alleviation programmes, irrigation, drinking water, sanitation 
and education is a must for ordinary people, whether provided 
proactively or on request” ([18], 7).  First, note that in many 
cases  others  will  have  an  interest  in  not  imparting  crucial 
information that they have. Thus, if they are merely “free” to 
speak,  you  will  fail  to  receive  the  information  essential  to 
satisfying your fundamental interests.  Second, in many cases 
others will not have the information, because it is not in their 
interests to gather the information. This may be because they 
would prefer to spend their resources in some other way.  Or, 
it  may  be  because  they  would  rather  others  not  know the 
information.  Finally, even when the necessary information is 
available, in many cases persons will not have the resources 
necessary to “seek” or receive that information. 
Of  course,  the  claim  that  one  has  a  welfare  right  to 
information  does  not  mean  that  one  has  a  right  to  all 
information.  How much information, on what topics, and in 
what  formats  cannot  be  precisely  specified  here;  to  some 
extent  they  will  vary  by  cultural,  economic,  and  personal 
circumstances.   Such  more  specific  determinations  should 
largely be left to the deliberations of participants in particular 
societies.  We can, at most, sketch the general outlines of what 
such  rights  would  obligate  individuals  and  societies  to  do. 
Establishing and supporting such institutions as, for example, 
public libraries,  are an essential  obligation for governments 
who wish to fulfill their positive duties to their citizens. 
6.  LIBRARIES AS HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTITUTIONS
When  we  argue  that  persons  have  a  right  to  access 
information,  we  are  committing  ourselves  to  ensuring  that 
persons have access to some technology or institution, which 
provides access  to that  information.   As Klaaren ([19], 20) 
points out, a right to information is the right to a “mechanism 
for access to information.” 
In this information age, the temptation is immediately to jump 
to the mechanism of technology as the best way to provide 
people with access to information.  At this point, a discussion 
of the digital divide may be expected.  However, this quick 
move from a concern about the right to access information to 
the  access  to  information  technology  should  be  resisted. 
While  it  is  surely  the  case  that  access  to  information 
technologies may improve a person’s access to information, 
we must keep in mind that such access is merely a means to an 
end.  There  is  no  value  in  having  access  to  information 
technology in itself.  Thus, we will do better to focus on how 
to  promote  access  to  information,  while  giving  recent 
information  technologies  their  due  as  one  powerful 
mechanism.  (In this  vein,  it  is  amusing to note that,  in his 
discussion,  Klaaren  proposes  giving  out  free  cell-phones, 
rather than providing access to public libraries.)
Indeed,  in the literature on rights to information,  there is  a 
notable  failure  to  consider  the  role  of  libraries  and 
professional  librarians.   Consider,  for  example,  the  list  of 
suggestions at the end of a report entitled, “Global Trends on 
the  Right  to  Information”  compiled  by  the  Human  Rights 
organization  Article  19.   The  report  makes  a  number  of 
recommendations  for  governments,  civil  society,  and 
businesses among which are the following ([18], 155-157): 
• Governments  ought  to  “develop  and  support 
appropriate  systems  for  the  dissemination  of 
information to all  members of society, taking into 
account  culture,  education,  wealth  and  other 
differences.” 
• Civil  Society  ought  to  “develop  and  apply 
innovative  and  effective  methods  of  producing, 
accessing, disseminating and using information.” 
• Businesses ought to “contribute actively, including 
through  technical  and  economic  support,  to 
establishing  better  systems  for  information 
generation, storage and dissemination.”
No  mention  is  made  of  public  libraries  or  the  need  for 
professional librarians and archivists. Yet, clearly it would be 
extremely  difficult  to  fulfill  any  of  these  three  mandates 
without  them.  In  the  following,  I  note  the  ways  in  which 
public  libraries  and  professional  librarians  can  serve  as  a 
lynchpin institution that can insure that individuals’ rights to 
access information are fulfilled and can further the promotion 
of commitment to human rights more generally.
6.1 Libraries
First, libraries provide people with information (both text and 
digital),  which they otherwise  would not be able  to access. 
Without  free  public  libraries,  this  access  may  be  blocked 
either by financial, educational, or other barriers.  To address 
this,  libraries should be concerned to collect,  in addition to 
works of  literature  and  accessible  reading  materials,  works 
that address basic information needs relative to the context, 
e.g.,  works on health,  science,  child rearing,  etc.  Libraries 
also  may  serve  as  places  where  public  and  governmental 
information may be archived and organized.  Second, libraries 
provide a centralized access point so that people know where 
to  get  information  and  they  organize  information  so  that 
people can find what they need and explore further.   Third, 
libraries  help  promote  literacy  by  giving  people  access  to 
books and fostering a literate culture. They may also promote 
digital  literacy by providing  access  to  computers and other 
information  technologies.   Finally,  by  putting  together  a 
collection  of  materials  from a  wide  range  of  cultures  and 
points of view, libraries can promote both understanding and 
tolerance.
While libraries are key to the promotion of literacy within a 
society, we want to avoid a view that holds that, as one writer 
put it,  “Only educated (literate) people can use the right to 
information. Illiterates cannot use this right even if they need 
it” ([20],  104).   Other  means  of  informing  the public—via 
readings,  public  lectures,  discussions,  etc.—should  also  be 
seen as part of the library’s mandate as a public information 
center.  Libraries as institutions should go out to the people to 
bring  them  important  information  and  to  find  out  the 
information needs of the people and the best ways to deliver 
this information.  Such outreach activities are more likely to 
create a greater commitment to literacy and to the library as a 
storehouse of knowledge.
My vision here has been shaped by the role of public libraries 
in the United States, with which I am most familiar. But I am 
not  suggesting  that  others  simply  adopt  the  U.S.  model. 
Indeed, by reflecting on the rationale behind supporting public 
libraries—because they are essential institutions in a society 
that respects human rights—
we can re-envision the role of libraries in the U.S. as well.  For 
example,  U.S.  libraries  ought  to  play  a  stronger  role  in 
providing citizens with access to government documents and 
information.  In addition,  they should take it as part of their 
mandate to make the public aware of this information.   
6.2 Professional Librarians
If  public  libraries  are  to  serve  their  role  as  human  rights 
institutions,  they  ideally  should  be  staffed  by  professional 
librarians.   The importance  of  librarians  goes beyond their 
crucial  skills  in  finding  and  organizing  information.   By 
employing library workers whose activities are governed by 
professional standards (as expressed, for example, in codes of 
professional ethics),  we create a profession dedicated to the 
“informational health” of individuals and the society, just as 
doctors are dedicated to individual and public health.  Thus, 
professional librarians have and ought to serve as important 
advocates  for  protecting  the  information  rights  of  the 
communities they serve. 
7. CONCLUSION
I have argued that we must to move beyond the conception of 
intellectual  rights  as  mere  liberty  rights,  which  can  be 
protected by the government letting individuals alone. Given 
the pivotal role of access to information in the exercise of all 
other  human  rights,  the  right  to  information  should  be 
understood as a welfare right that places on governments (and 
perhaps others) the duty to provide people with information. 
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